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I. BASIC STRUCTURE AND TAKE-UP OF WELLNESS PROGRAMS
Despite spawning a broad empirical literature and a six-billion-dollar-
per-year industry, no formal or universally accepted definition of a 
“wellness program” exists.1 In reviewing the workplace-wellness market for 
a report the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) commissioned, scholars at the 
RAND Corporation broadly defined a workplace-wellness program as “an 
employment-based activity of employer-sponsored benefit aimed at 
promoting health-related behaviors (primary prevention or health 
promotion) and disease management (secondary prevention).” Initiatives 
†  This project was supported by grant number T32HS000055 from the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality. The content is solely the responsibility of the 
authors and do not necessarily reflect the positions or policies of the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, Boston 
University, Harvard University, Indiana University, or University of Michigan. 
1. RAND CORP., DO WORKPLACE WELLNESS PROGRAMS SAVE EMPLOYERS MONEY? (2014); RAND 
CORP., WORKPLACE WELLNESS PROGRAMS STUDY: FINAL REPORT 2 (2013) [hereinafter FINAL
REPORT].
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targeting primary prevention are also sometimes called “lifestyle 
management” programs, a term used throughout this paper.2 
Screening activities, such as health-risk appraisals and biometric 
screenings, are the most common elements of wellness programs and 
frequently serve as the entry point for lifestyle and disease interventions. 
Health-risk appraisals are self-reported surveys with questions about health 
behaviors such as eating habits, exercise, smoking, and stress, while 
biometric screens collect clinical data, like blood pressure, glucose, and 
body-mass index. A minority of employers offer only screening activities, 
without follow-up interventions.3 
Lifestyle management targets risk factors for chronic disease, and such 
programs are oriented toward preventing chronic diseases. The most 
ubiquitous preventive interventions focus on nutrition, weight 
management, fitness, and smoking cessation; in 2012, over seventy percent 
of lifestyle-management programs offered these components. About half 
also offered some type of support for alcohol- and substance-use disorders 
and stress management.4 
Specific program design varies widely by employer; the menu of 
available lifestyle interventions includes subsidized gym memberships, 
onsite weight-management group meetings, or telephone counseling to 
help employees quit smoking. Environmental changes to the workplace 
designed to encourage healthier behavior—putting more nutritious food in 
vending machines and the cafeteria or offering on-site vaccinations and 
fitness activities—could also be considered lifestyle interventions.5 A 
defining feature of lifestyle management is that the initiatives are available 
to all participants; employees need not qualify in order to participate in 
these components of a wellness program. 
By contrast, disease-management programs are limited to employees 
with manifest chronic conditions, such as diabetes, heart disease, asthma, 
or depression.6 Disease-management interventions are typically 
individually tailored and coordinated with the employee’s personal 
physician; they aim to improve health through better medication 
adherence and bolstered patient self-care knowledge and ability.7 
Disease-management and lifestyle-management programs are 
sometimes administered separately, and employers may offer one type of 
intervention without the other.8 Historically, lifestyle-management 
 
2. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 2. 
3. Id. at 26. 
4. Id. at 31. 
5. Id. at xvi; Id. at 23. 
6. Id. at 31. 
7. John P. Caloyeras et al., Managing Manifest Diseases, But Not Health Risks, Saved 
PepsiCo Money Over Seven Years, 33 HEALTH AFF. 124, 125-126 (2014) 
8.  FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 33. 
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programs have been more prevalent: according to a 2015 survey, eighty-
one percent of large employers—those with more than two hundred 
workers—offered some sort of lifestyle management as part of a wellness 
program, compared to the sixty-eight percent that offered disease 
management. This gap is even wider among small firms, where forty-nine 
percent offered lifestyle interventions; only thirty-two percent reported 
that disease management was available in their programs.9 
Firms frequently offer financial incentives to encourage employee 
participation in wellness programs. The Affordable Care Act has expanded 
the scope of incentives available to employers, as detailed in Part IV. The 
incidence of incentives, however, is not distributed evenly across types of 
wellness initiatives. Nearly one-third of all employers with health benefits 
offer incentives to workers or require them to complete a health-risk 
assessment; this rate is much higher among large firms than small firms.10 
Disease management is the least likely component of wellness programs to 
be subject to incentives.11 This may be related to concerns about targeting 
incentives specifically toward individuals diagnosed with chronic diseases; 
this paper will further examine that tension in Part VI. 
II. THE CONCEPTUAL CASE FOR WELLNESS PROGRAMS 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimate that 
eighty-six percent of national health expenditures could be attributed to 
treatment for chronic medical conditions in 2010, representing over $2.2 
trillion in one year alone.12 Chronic conditions—including hypertension, 
depression, diabetes, and heart disease—account for seven out of ten 
deaths each year in the United States.13 In addition to being common and 
costly, chronic conditions are often preventable. Many conditions are 
associated with adverse risk behaviors like poor nutrition, inadequate 
physical activity, and alcohol and tobacco use. In theory, diminishing or 
eliminating these adverse behaviors should reduce the prevalence of 
chronic disease. 
Over recent decades, chronic disease has become more commonplace, 
and the burden has shifted from the elderly to include more working-age 
adults. One analysis suggests that the number of non-elderly adults with at 
 
9. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC. TRUST, 2015 EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS, 
at Summary of Findings 7 (2015). 
10. Id. at 6. 
11. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at xxii. 
12. Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/chronicdisease/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2017). 
13. Id. 
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least one chronic condition increased by over twenty-five percent from 
1997 to 2006.14 
Given that fifty-nine percent of Americans aged nineteen to sixty-four 
had employer-sponsored insurance in 2014, some of the financial burden 
of chronic disease is borne by firms that provide health coverage as part of 
a compensation and benefits package.15 Direct costs manifest in the form 
of healthcare expenses that accrue from providing health coverage. Firms 
with employees who seek relatively more—or relatively more expensive—
care bear those costs through higher insurance premiums if they purchase 
insurance, or higher medical spending if they self-insure. 
Indirectly, chronic conditions can also increase absenteeism—missing 
work for health-related reasons—and “presenteeism”—working while sick, 
leading to reduced productivity. Some analyses have suggested that these 
indirect costs are substantial. One survey administered by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers found that absenteeism and presenteeism are up 
to four times higher for individuals with chronic disease than for those 
without.16 A separate report from the Milken Institute suggested that these 
indirect costs actually exceed direct health expenditures.17 
Among the privately insured, most of the ten conditions for which 
spending grew the fastest between 1987 and 2009—including mental 
disorders, pulmonary disease, hyperlipidemia, and diabetes—were chronic 
diseases.18 Over one-third of the increase in spending on such conditions is 
attributable to an increase in the number of people receiving treatment.19 
In 2012, investigators evaluated the economic impact of ten common, 
modifiable health risk factors, including blood pressure, total cholesterol, 
obesity, blood glucose levels, tobacco use, and physical inactivity.20 The 
authors reported that these ten factors were associated with over twenty 
 
14. Catherine Hoffman & Karyn Schwartz, Eroding Access Among Nonelderly U.S. 
Adults with Chronic Conditions: Ten Years of Change, 27 HEALTH AFF. W340, W342 
(2008). 
15. Health Insurance Coverage of Adults 19-64, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 
http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/adults-19-64/?currentTimeframe=0 (last 
visited Feb. 18, 2017). 
16. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS’ HEALTH RESEARCH INST., THE PRICE OF EXCESS: IDENTIFYING WASTE 
IN HEALTHCARE SPENDING 7 (2008). 
17. ROSS DEVOL ET AL., AN UNHEALTHY AMERICA: THE ECONOMIC BURDEN OF CHRONIC DISEASE 7 
(2007). 
18. Kenneth E. Thorpe, Treated Disease Prevalence and Spending Per Treated Case 
Drove Most of the Growth in Health Care Spending in 1987-2009, 32 HEALTH AFF. 
851, 856 (2013). 
19. Id. 
20. Ron Z. Goetzel et al., Ten Modifiable Health Risk Factors are Linked to More than 
One-Fifth of Employer-Employee Health Care Spending, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2474, 2476 
(2012). 
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percent of total employer-employee health spending.21 At the individual 
level, being at high risk for depression was most strongly correlated with 
increased medical spending among the ten risk factors evaluated. On 
average, employees at high risk for depression had medical spending that 
was forty-eight percent higher than their counterparts who were not. High 
blood glucose, high blood pressure, and obesity were also strong drivers of 
health spending; those risk factors were associated with health spending 
increases of 31.8 percent, 31.6 percent, and 27.4 percent, respectively, 
compared to patients who did not exhibit these risk factors. 
In principle, health expenditures associated with modifiable behavior 
are health expenditures that might be avoided. Wellness programs tempt 
employers with an alluring promise: they can help employees get and stay 
healthy, leading to increased time at work, improved productivity, and 
reduced health spending. It is a promise that employers believe in: some 
forty-three percent of surveyed employers believe that wellness programs 
deliver positive returns on investment.22 Others are more reserved in their 
confidence about financial returns, but nonetheless see the programs as 
effective recruitment and retention tools.23 
III: WHAT THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT CHANGED 
For legal purposes, wellness programs come in two essential forms. 
Participatory wellness programs offer employees a financial incentive 
based only on their participation.24 Employees might receive a reward, for 
instance, if they fill out a health assessment or attend a smoking-cessation 
class.25 The reward can take a variety of forms: a premium discount or 
rebate, waived or reduced cost-sharing, or the elimination of a surcharge.26 
Alternatively, employees might be penalized for failing to participate. 
Health-contingent wellness programs require employees to achieve health-
related targets in order to receive the financial incentive.27 Employees 
 
21. Id. at 2474. 
22. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 2. 
23. See The Business of Healthy Employees: A Survey of Workplace Health Priorities, 
VIRGIN PULSE, 10 (2014), https://www.shrm.org/ResourcesAndTools/hr-
topics/benefits/Documents/PulsePaper_ BusinessHealthyEmployees2014.pdf 
(finding 88 percent of employees find wellness programs an important factor 
when seeking employment). 
24. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 2 
25. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SECURITY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET: THE AFFORDABLE CARE 
ACT AND WELLNESS PROGRAMS (2014) [hereinafter FACT SHEET], available at 
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-
activities/resource-center/fact-sheets/fswellnessprogram.pdf. 
26. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at xxi. 
27. FACT SHEET, supra note 25. 
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might, for example, have to visit the gym a certain number of times each 
month or keep their blood pressure under control. 
On their face, participatory wellness programs treat all employees 
alike. Health-contingent programs, however, discriminate among 
employees based on factors related to their health. That, in turn, creates a 
potential conflict with laws that aim to prevent employers from 
discriminating against their sickest employees in the provision of health 
insurance. Most prominently, the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) prohibits employers from creating 
eligibility rules or adjusting employee premiums based on “health status-
related factors.”28 Without an exception, HIPAA would have precluded 
employers from adopting health-contingent wellness programs. To enable 
such programs, Congress crafted an exception that allowed employers to 
condition up to twenty percent of the cost of coverage upon successfully 
meeting wellness standards. 
Enthusiasm for wellness programs grew over the next decade, spurred 
in particular by reports from companies like Safeway, which claimed that 
adopting a wellness program allowed it to hold its healthcare costs 
constant.29 It did not matter that those reports were, in fact, wildly 
misleading; a 2005 restructuring of its employee-benefit plan accounted for 
the spending reductions, not a wellness program.30 Wellness programs had 
captured Congress’s imagination. 
In 2010, Congress used the Affordable Care Act to relax HIPAA’s 
strictures.31 Under current law, employers are permitted to make thirty 
percent of an employee’s premiums contingent on achieving health 
objectives and up to fifty percent on tobacco cessation.32 The ACA further 
gives the Secretaries of the Treasury, the Departments of Labor, and Health 
and Human Services authority to increase this general limit to fifty percent 
of the cost of coverage.33 
IV. THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE: KEY FINDINGS AND CRITIQUES 
Most of the numerous studies on the efficacy of employer-based 
wellness programs suffer from serious methodological shortcomings. Some 
are little more than thinly-veiled promotional materials pulled together at 
 
28. 29 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1) (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 1182(b)(1) (2012). 
29. Steven A. Burd, How Safeway Is Cutting Health-Care Costs, WALL ST. J. (June 12, 
2009), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124476804026308603. 
30. David S. Hilzenrath, Misleading Claims about Safeway Wellness Incentives Shape 
Health-Care Bill, WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2010), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/15/AR2010 
011503319_pf.html. 
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(a) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j) (2012). 
32. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(A). 
33. Id. 
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the wellness industry’s behest. But good studies do exist and, when 
considered together, they paint a reasonably consistent picture of wellness 
programs’ performances, or lack thereof. 
To bring that picture into focus, we will examine the available research 
from two perspectives. We will start with several studies that rigorously 
evaluate the experience of individual firms with wellness programs. 
Sensitive to the limitations of studies that focus on a single firm, however, 
we then step back and examine several meta-analyses that have helped 
frame contemporary discussion around employer-based wellness 
initiatives. The message of these studies, taken together, is clear. Wellness 
programs aimed at improving employee lifestyles yield little, if any, savings. 
Programs that focus on managing employees’ chronic diseases, however, 
hold substantially more promise. 
Experience of individual employers 
The three studies considered below feature large employers—Johnson 
& Johnson, PepsiCo, and the University of Minnesota—that have 
undertaken periodic analyses of their wellness programs. In all three cases, 
the most recent analysis was published after 2010. Conclusions from 
individual studies must be drawn with caution; findings from one employer 
may not be generalizable to other institutions. This section is not intended 
to be comprehensive—meta-analyses offer a more holistic picture—but is 
representative of a few key issues in the literature: the effects of disease-
management versus lifestyle interventions, the importance of longer-time 
horizons for elucidating the impact of wellness programs, and the nature of 
a positive return-on-investment (“ROI”) study. 
A. Johnson & Johnson 
The Johnson & Johnson family of companies has offered workplace 
wellness initiatives since 1979.34 In its current form, the firm’s Live for Life 
program includes lifestyle components— reimbursement for gym 
memberships, weight-loss program memberships, and computerized 
coaching, among others—in addition to chronic disease management. The 
company offered a five-hundred-dollar incentive for employees who 
completed a health-risk assessment and participated in follow-up 
programs; the five hundred dollars were a credit that could be applied 
toward a worker’s health insurance premium. 
Researchers, including two senior executives from Johnson & Johnson, 
conducted an analysis that compared Johnson & Johnson’s health costs 
against those from similar, de-identified large firms.35 The sixteen 
comparison companies varied in their wellness program offerings. Johnson 
& Johnson employees were “matched” to employees of other firms along 
 
34. Rachel M. Henke et al., Recent Experience in Health Promotion at Johnson & 
Johnson: Lower Health Spending, Strong Return on Investment, 30 HEALTH AFF. 490, 
490 (2011). 
35. Id. at 491. 
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dimensions of age, sex, geographic region, and health-plan type. Employees 
were not matched on comorbidities or other observable measures of health 
status, but the analysis adjusted for the Charlson Comorbidity Index, an 
aggregate measure of chronic-disease burden,36 as well as psychiatric 
diagnoses and the richness of the employer’s insurance plan. As with all 
observational studies, it is possible that meaningful but unobservable 
differences remain, which could bias results. 
Relative to comparison firms, Johnson & Johnson experienced 3.7 
percent lower annual growth in health care expenditures over the 2002 to 
2008 study window. This analysis did not differentiate between whether 
employees participated in lifestyle-management or disease-management 
components of the program, so inferences about the sources of savings 
cannot be drawn easily from this study alone. Assuming that health costs 
otherwise would have grown at rates similar to their peers, the study 
estimated that Live for Life saved Johnson & Johnson between $1.88 and 
$3.92 for every dollar spent, depending on assumptions about 
administrative costs.37 It is unclear why the analysis used a range of proxy 
costs, instead of calculating ROI using the actual cost of program 
administration. 
B. PepsiCo 
A seven-year evaluation of PepsiCo’s wellness program provides one of 
the longest study time horizons in the literature.38 The company introduced 
Healthy Living, a wellness program that offered both lifestyle- and disease-
management elements, in 2003. Healthy Living provided five lifestyle-
management programs in 2011, targeting fitness, nutrition management, 
weight management, stress management, and smoking cessation.39 
Disease management was offered to employees that had at least one of the 
following ten chronic conditions: asthma, atrial fibrillation, chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease, congestive heart failure, coronary artery 
disease, diabetes, hyperlipidemia, hypertension, lower-back pain, or 
stroke.40 
For the lifestyle-management program, investigators considered seven 
years of program data following two baseline years; for disease 
management, they had eight years of program data following one baseline 
year.41 Program participants were matched to nonparticipants within the 
company on a number of variables, including age, sex, geographic location, 
 
36. Mary Charlson et al., The Charlson Comorbidity Index Can Be Used Prospectively 
to Identify Patients Who Will Incur High Future Costs, 9 PLOS ONE 1, 2 (2014). 
37. Henke et al., supra note 34, at 495. 
38. Caloyeras et al., supra note 7, at 125. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 125-126. 
41. Id. at 125. 
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medical costs, and comorbidities.42 The authors aimed to ensure that 
changes in health spending were not attributable to any observable ex ante 
differences between employees that did and did not participate in the 
wellness program. By comparing employees within the firm, the authors 
also assured that the analysis was not confounded by factors that might 
vary across companies. 
The analysis found a $1.46 overall ROI, meaning that for every dollar 
invested in the program, PepsiCo saved $1.46 in health costs. However, 
savings were not balanced evenly across the lifestyle-management and 
disease-management programs; the disease-management program 
accounted for all net savings. For each dollar invested in the lifestyle-
management program, PepsiCo only saved $0.48, meaning that the lifestyle 
management resulted in a net loss to the firm, even after accounting for 
changes in self-reported absenteeism.43 By contrast, the return for disease 
management alone was $3.78.44 Fewer employees participated in disease 
management than lifestyle management. The authors noted that the 
disease-management participants who also participated in the lifestyle-
management program demonstrated significantly higher savings overall, 
suggesting that there may be an interaction effect and that targeting 
lifestyle-management programs toward employees with manifest chronic 
disease may improve their ROI. 
C. University of Minnesota 
John A. Nyman and his coauthors have published multiple papers 
evaluating the University of Minnesota’s health-promotion program at 
various stages after its 2006 implementation. The program included a 
wellness assessment with an incentive for completion; using results from 
the wellness assessment, health coaching was available to enrollees who 
were identified to have a risk factor, and disease management was available 
for enrollees identified as having one or more chronic diseases.45 Additional 
lifestyle components included a 10,000-step program and web-based 
health resources.46 
The analysis used baseline data from 2004 through 2006 and tracked 
average monthly expenditures, comparing employees who participated in 
at least one of the program components —wellness assessment, lifestyle 
management, or disease management—against employees who did not 
 
42. Id. at 126. 
43. Id. at 128. 
44. Id. 
45.  John A. Nyman et al., The Effectiveness of Health Promotion at the University of 
Minnesota: Expenditures, Absenteeism, and Participation in Specific Programs, 52 
J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. 269, 272 (2010). 
46. Walking Program: 10k a Day, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, 
https://humanresources.umn.edu/exercise-and-fitness/walking-program (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2017). 
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participate in the program.47 Employees were not “matched” in this 
analysis, but the study used a strong econometric design to control for the 
presence of specific risk factors and chronic diseases. In the first two years 
of the program, the investigators determined that the lifestyle-
management program did not reduce health expenditures, while the 
disease-management program did.48 However, the disease-management 
program savings were not sufficient over this time period to overcome the 
cost of administering both programs.49 
In the third year, the program delivered a positive ROI, generating 
$1.76 in savings for every dollar invested in the program. These results were 
driven entirely by the disease-management component through reduced 
health expenditures alone; disease management was not associated with a 
significant reduction in absenteeism. Participation in the lifestyle-
management program was not associated with reduced expenditures or 
absenteeism.50 
Evidence from meta-analyses and literature reviews:   
A. Baicker et al. 
A widely cited meta-analysis published in 2010 by Katherine Baicker 
and coauthors evaluated thirty-two peer-reviewed publications on wellness 
programs and found strong positive returns on investment.51 To be included 
in the review, studies had to offer “well-defined” interventions, treatment 
groups, and comparison groups, though comparison groups were not 
always randomly assigned. The review does not distinguish between 
“disease management,” “lifestyle management,” and hybrid programs. 
Accounting for the cost of the programs—this is the analysis that 
suggested wellness programs cost an average of $144 per employee per 
year to administer—Baicker and colleagues reported an average ROI of 
$3.27 with regard to direct health costs.52 They also found a significant ROI 
of $2.73 in reduced absenteeism.53 
The authors are careful to outline potential sources of bias that could 
skew their findings; the authors raise concerns of selection bias and 
publication bias throughout the paper’s introduction, results, and 
discussion.54 The voluntary nature of most wellness programs is a key 
 
47. Nyman et al., supra note 45, at 270-272. 
48. See id. at 278. 
49. Id. 
50.  Id. at 276. 
51. Katherine Baicker et al., Workplace Wellness Programs Can Generate Savings, 29 
HEALTH AFF. 1, 2 (2010). 
52. Id. at 4. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 1-6. 
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source of potential selection bias: employees who participate in the 
program may differ from the comparison group in important but 
unobservable characteristics, such as individual motivation to lose weight 
or quit smoking. The authors also stipulate that studies finding strong 
positive returns for wellness programs may be more likely to be submitted 
or accepted for publication than studies that demonstrate no impact.55 
Furthermore, the meta-analysis does not discern between lifestyle- and 
disease-management interventions.56 
Many of the studies Baicker included are now twenty or more years 
old—nineteen of the thirty-two papers were published before 1996—which 
should give scholars pause in attempting to generalize findings to today’s 
wellness programs. Advances in medical therapies may have diminished the 
potential that wellness programs once had. As an example, John P. 
Caloyeras and colleagues highlight that statins only achieved widespread 
use for cholesterol control in the nineties.57 Absent this therapy, early 
wellness programs may have had a greater effect on health outcomes and 
spending.58 
B. Osilla et al. 
One of the most comprehensive reviews to date was published to 
accompany RAND’s 2012 Workplace Wellness Programs Study, sponsored 
by the United States Departments of Labor and Health and Human Services 
and commissioned as part of the Affordable Care Act.59 The review, 
published in the American Journal of Managed Care, included thirty-three 
articles published after 2000, in contrast to the older studies evaluated by 
Baicker et al. In order to be included in this review, studies had to be 
published after 2000 and have a control or other comparison group. The 
review focused on “comprehensive” wellness programs but did not treat 
disease management and lifestyle management as distinct categories. 
Seventeen of the thirty-three included studies were randomized controlled 
trials (“RCTs”); ten of the remaining studies used observational designs, and 
six had comparison groups that were not random in assignment. Ultimately, 
the authors reported “mixed results” while raising questions about the rigor 
of study designs.60 
Cumulatively, the included studies tested sixty-three wide-ranging 
outcomes; this diversity makes it difficult to generalize lessons for any 
particular domain. Each study evaluated one or more of the following: 
 
55. Id. at 6. 
56. MICHAEL BORENSTEIN ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO META-ANALYSIS 377 (2009). 
57. Caloyeras et al., supra note 7 at 129. 
58. Id. 
59. Karen Chan Osilla et al., Systematic Review of the Impact of Worksite Wellness 
Programs, 18 AM. J. MANAGED CARE e68, e68-69 (2012). 
60. Id. at e78. 
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exercise, diet, physiological markers, healthcare costs, smoking, 
absenteeism, mental health, and alcohol use. Most studies suggested that 
wellness programs had positive effects, but the authors strongly qualify this 
finding in the review. Studies with observational designs demonstrated 
positive effects in about three-quarters of cases, substantially more than in 
randomized controlled trials, which demonstrated positive effects in only 
about half of cases. 
Evidence on absenteeism and healthcare costs proved particularly 
sparse. Only eight studies that evaluated health costs as an outcome met 
the review’s inclusion criteria, and just one of those studies was an RCT, 
which did not find an effect. The four observational studies that evaluated 
absenteeism found positive effects—including one study that suggested a 
return of $15.60 for every dollar spent61—but no RCTs were available to 
corroborate these findings rigorously. This limited body of evidence stands 
in contrast to the volume of literature on healthcare costs and absenteeism 
published before 2000. 
Other critiques of the literature 
 Concerns with the methodological validity of the wellness literature 
range beyond the selection bias and publication bias Baicker highlighted in 
the 2010 review. Studies often have short time horizons—Osilla reported 
that seventy percent of studies included had a follow-up of two years or 
fewer62—and failing to follow a study population for a sufficient period of 
time could lead to either underestimates of the program effect if the 
benefits take several years to accrue as health or financial outcomes or 
overestimates if smoking cessation, weight loss, or other health gains lapse 
in the long term, for example, or if there are diminishing returns that are 
overwhelmed by administrative costs after some time. 
A 2014 paper by Siyan Baxter and colleagues sought to determine 
whether there was a relationship between wellness programs’ reported 
returns on investment and the quality of study methodology in peer-
reviewed evaluations.63 In order to assess study “quality,” the authors used 
a thirty-six-item checklist developed by The BMJ, a general-medicine 
journal.64 The checklist contains questions about study design, data 
collection, and analysis and interpretation of results.65 The authors 
conducted a sensitivity analysis for quality scoring by using two additional 
 
61. Steven Aldana et al., Financial Impact of a Comprehensive Multisite Workplace 
Health Promotion Program, 40 PREVENTATIVE MEDICINE 131, 135 (2005). 
62. Osilla et al., supra note 59, at e78. 
63.  Siyan Baxter et al., The Relationship Between Return on Investment and Quality 
of Study Methodology in Workplace Health Promotion Programs, 28 AM. J. HEALTH 
PROMOTION 347, 348 (2014). 
64. Id. at 349. 
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methodological—quality checklists, which resulted in similar relative—
quality scores. 
In the review, Baxter reported that included studies generally reported 
positive returns on investment, “evidenced in all instances except 
randomized control trials.” The authors further reported that 
methodological quality was a significant predictor of ROI; the lowest-quality 
studies reported the highest ROI figures, while more rigorously evaluated 
studies tended to report lower returns.66 
Even if we believe published findings to be methodologically sound, we 
must contend with issues of generalizability. As Baicker and coauthors 
remark in their review, the employers who are most likely to benefit from 
a wellness program are the same ones who are most likely to be early 
adopters of wellness programs.67 Additionally, the studies included in the 
reviews favor large employers; over ninety percent of employers in the 
Baicker paper and over half in the Osilla review had over one thousand 
employees.68 It is not clear that success reported by large firms could be 
easily replicated in smaller companies. 
Studies offer little discussion of the broader context in which their 
findings are rooted. Both the 1990s and recent years have seen trends in 
insurance design that could confound study results if not accounted for 
methodologically. In the 1990s, health-maintenance organizations 
(“HMOs,” or “managed care”) gained popularity, resulting in narrower 
networks and reduced health spending.69 More recently, high-deductible 
plans are increasingly prevalent among employer-sponsored insurance; 
higher deductibles also tend to reduce utilization and spending.70 A poorly 
designed study might attribute spending reductions to wellness programs 
when they are actually driven by secular changes in benefit design. Safeway 
made this error, for example, when it attributed a spending slowdown to 
its wellness program instead of a shift to greater employee cost-sharing. 
In a 2013 Health Affairs paper, Jill Horwitz and coauthors proffered a 
conceptual framework outlining the necessary conditions for a wellness 
program to work as intended—by reducing costs by promoting health.71 
First, the authors stipulate, a given program must be successfully designed 
to identify employees with targetable health risks; these employees must 
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be more expensive to employers than those without health risks.72 Next, 
the incentives offered—typically financial in nature—must, in fact, 
motivate employees to improve their health behaviors.73 Lastly, 
improvements in their health behaviors must necessarily lead to cost 
savings for employers. The authors were not convinced that available 
evidence firmly substantiates any of these assumptions, let alone all of 
them.74 Instead of improving employee health, the authors suggest, 
wellness programs that rely on financial incentives may function by shifting 
costs to employees with chronic health conditions, disproportionately 
penalizing sicker employees.75 In addition, to the extent that incentives shift 
costs from employer to employee, wellness program evaluations might 
overstate reductions in health spending. 
Economically speaking, providing participation rewards is considered 
equivalent to having penalties in place. Indeed, to the extent permitted, 
employers might prefer the use of penalties over rewards—though 
identical in a rational economic sense, empirical evidence has 
demonstrated that penalties are more successful in inducing behavior 
change than rewards.76 Furthermore, the authors point out, as wellness 
programs with incentives become more commonplace, we might expect 
this financial risk to be distributed in a regressive fashion; many of the 
chronic conditions’ risk factors of interest are disproportionately prevalent 
among low-income and minority populations, as well as the elderly.77 
It is also worth highlighting the uneven distribution and “stickiness” of 
health spending in general. Among the privately insured, under-sixty-five 
population, the bottom fifty percent of spenders represented less than ten 
percent of all health expenditures, while the top one percent of spenders 
represent fourteen percent of spending.78 Hirth and coauthors examined 
the persistence of high spending in this population and found that about 
one-third of spenders in the top ten percent remained in that decile five 
years later.79 This concentration of expenditures suggests that we should 
expect broad-based wellness programs to be substantially less efficient 
than programs designed to target high-cost individuals. 
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V: WELLNESS PROGRAMS AND DISCRIMINATION 
Setting aside their questionable efficacy, wellness programs are 
difficult to reconcile with a number of federal laws that aim to restrict 
employers’ ability to discriminate among their employees in the provision 
of health insurance. After all, the point of wellness programs is to 
discriminate. Those employees who adhere to the wellness program—
whether by filling out a detailed health assessment, taking a blood test, or 
attending smoking-cessation courses—pay less for their health coverage. 
Those who do not pay more. 
HIPAA is the most prominent of the laws that discourage employers 
from discriminating among employees. Because it prohibits employers from 
crafting eligibility rules or adjusting a worker’s premiums based on “health 
status-related factors,”80 Congress had to exempt health-contingent 
wellness programs from HIPAA in order to enable their adoption.81 But 
Congress has created no such exemption for a number of other laws—
including Title VII, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”), 
and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)—that also discourage 
discriminating among employees. Congress’s apparent enthusiasm for 
wellness programs is thus in tension with its longstanding commitment to 
equal treatment in the workplace. That tension has created challenges for 
employers and for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”), which has primary responsibility for implementing 
antidiscrimination laws. 
Health assessments have been a recurring source of confusion. Such 
assessments are often quite detailed and touch on sensitive subjects. At the 
same time, employers often bring financial pressure to bear on employees 
to fill them out. Penn State, for example, tried to impose a one-hundred-
dollar monthly insurance surcharge for failing to fill out a health assessment 
that asked, among other things, “whether employees have recently had 
problems with a supervisor, a separation or a divorce, their finances or a 
fear of job loss; another question asks female employees whether they plan 
to become pregnant over the next year.”82 At a raucous faculty meeting, 
covered in the New York Times, employees rebelled against requests to 
share that information.83 
Although Penn State beat a hasty retreat, the episode brought to light 
the tension between wellness programs and antidiscrimination law. Can 
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health assessments be squared with laws that aim to protect workers from 
discriminatory practices? Is it legal for employers to probe so deeply into 
their employees’ medical histories? 
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
Offering incentives for employees to take health assessments does not 
violate Title VII, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, religion, 
national origin, age, or gender.84 Incentives are questionable, however, for 
health assessments that ask about pregnancy or family planning. The 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”) was enacted in 1978 to clarify that 
Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination in the workplace also extends to 
pregnancy-related discrimination.85 
By its terms, Title VII does not forbid employers from asking about an 
employee’s pregnancy plans.86 To be liable under the PDA, an employer 
would have to fire the employee or otherwise take an adverse employment 
action against her because of her pregnancy status.87 Nonetheless, because 
the fact that an employer has asked about pregnancy “may indicate a 
possible intent to discriminate based on pregnancy,” the EEOC 
“recommend[s] that employers avoid these types of questions.”88 Many 
wellness programs buck that advice, perhaps because they generally do not 
share identifiable data with employers that might enable pregnancy 
discrimination.89 Time will tell if legal exposure or employee blowback leads 
wellness programs to drop pregnancy-related questions from their health 
assessments. 
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act 
In contrast to Title VII, GINA explicitly restricts what sorts of 
information employers can solicit from their employees. Under GINA, an 
employer may not “request, require, or purchase genetic information for 
underwriting purposes.”90 The EEOC has interpreted this provision to mean 
that a refusal to disclose genetic information cannot affect how much an 
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employee pays for health coverage.91 Because adherence to a wellness 
program affects the cost of employer-sponsored coverage, employers 
cannot offer a financial incentive for employees to complete a health 
assessment requesting the disclosure of genetic information. 
What is genetic information? In general, it is defined narrowly enough 
to exclude conventional medical histories or screenings, which do not 
inquire into the genetic basis for diseases.92 Significantly, however, genetic 
information includes the “manifestation of a disease or disorder in family 
members of an individual.”93 The reason is simple: a family member’s illness 
may suggest a genetic propensity in the individual employee. So asking an 
employee whether she has ever had breast cancer does not violate GINA, 
but asking whether her sister or mother has ever had breast cancer does.94 
Yet, until recently, such questions were apparently common in health 
assessments.95 
What about spouses? Because an employee’s spouse does not share a 
genetic background with the employee, the spouse’s disease history is 
unlikely to enable discrimination against the employee on the basis of her 
genetic information. Plus, employers that offer family coverage have a 
genuine financial interest in the health of their employees’ spouses. Some 
employers, for example, have adopted wellness programs imposing a 
substantial “tobacco surcharge” on employees with a spouse who 
smokes.96 
Seeing no reason to prohibit the practice, the EEOC finalized a rule in 
May 2016 “clarifying” that employers can offer substantial penalties—thirty 
percent of the price of self-only coverage—in exchange for information 
relating to a spouse’s manifestation of a disease or disorder.97 Because the 
average price of self-only coverage was $6251 in 2014,98 an average 
employee could face a penalty of up to $1875. These financial inducements 
cannot be used to solicit any information about the diseases or disorders of 
an employee’s children, since those may signal something about the 
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employee’s own genetic information,99 but information about a spouse’s 
ailments is fair game. 
The only problem is that the EEOC’s rule appears to contravene GINA. 
The statute uses absolute language to prohibit employers from requesting 
genetic information that will affect the rates that employees pay for health 
coverage.100 And the statute could not be clearer that genetic information 
includes the “manifestation of a disease or disorder in family members of 
an individual,” spouses included.101 The EEOC cannot add an exception to 
the statute because it believes it would be sensible to do so. It is not even 
clear that the EEOC is correct that a spouse’s medical history raises 
“minimal” risk of genetic discrimination against the employee.102 That 
history, for example, might suggest that the employee’s children, who may 
be covered on her health plan, have a genetic predisposition to certain 
diseases. That predisposition might tempt employers to discriminate 
against the employee. Congress is free to guard against that risk, and it has 
done so in GINA. The EEOC’s rule therefore appears vulnerable to legal 
challenge from an employee who suffers a penalty for refusing to share her 
spouse’s medical information. 
Americans with Disabilities Act 
The debate over asking about a spouse’s health status is a minor issue 
when compared to the difficulties that the ADA poses for health 
assessments. To avoid the risk of disability discrimination, the ADA prohibits 
employers from conducing medical examinations of their employees, 
including medical histories, unless they are “voluntary.”103 Most health 
assessments include detailed questions about employees’ medical 
histories; as such, the ADA requires those assessments to be offered on a 
voluntary basis. 
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That presents a conundrum. Can a health assessment be “voluntary” if 
an employee faces a financial penalty for refusing to take it? In its 2016 
rulemaking, the EEOC answered that question affirmatively, concluding that 
ACA-compliant wellness programs do not violate the ADA.104 Employers are 
therefore free, under the rule, to offer inducements of up to thirty percent 
of the cost of the employee’s coverage to encourage the completion of 
health assessments.105 
Once again, however, the EEOC’s rule appears untenable. The agency 
defends its interpretation with reference to the claim that the agency’s job 
is “to provide as much consistency as possible” between the ADA and the 
ACA.106 In this, the EEOC could have in mind two different legal arguments. 
Neither is compelling. 
First, the EEOC might believe that the ACA implicitly created a safe 
harbor from the ADA for practices that the ACA explicitly authorizes. The 
intuition is that Congress would not have allowed employers to establish 
robust wellness programs if most of those programs would violate the ADA. 
Instead, Congress should be taken to have narrowed the scope of the ADA 
when it comes to asking about medical histories. 
A well-established rule of interpretation, however, holds that Congress 
cannot be understood to repeal its prior handiwork by implication.107 The 
rule exists for good reason. Courts and agencies cannot repeal laws; only 
Congress can do that. By the same token, courts and agencies cannot ignore 
a duly enacted law just because they suspect a later Congress would have 
preferred to do away with it. And who knows what Congress’s attitude was 
toward the ADA? Congress may not have understood that wellness 
programs raise concerns about disability discrimination. It is not at all clear 
how Congress would have resolved the tension between the ACA and the 
ADA had it considered the matter. 
Until Congress clarifies matters, the proper approach is to say that the 
ACA authorizes wellness programs only to the extent that they do not 
violate the ADA. The statutes are not in irreconcilable conflict. Wellness 
programs that discourage smoking, for example, will not run afoul of the 
ADA since nicotine addiction is probably not a disability within the meaning 
of the statute.108 Similarly, wellness programs could drop their health 
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assessments in order to comply with the ADA. If that inhibits certain types 
of wellness programs, it is up to Congress to come up with a fix, not the 
EEOC. 
Second, the EEOC might believe that, because the word “voluntary” can 
be interpreted more or less restrictively, it is appropriate for the agency to 
select the interpretation that fits best with other statutes, including the 
ACA. That is true, as far as it goes: if at all possible, statutes enacted at 
different times should be interpreted to cohere with one another.109 To put 
it in the language of administrative law, agencies can properly take into 
account later-enacted statutes at the second step of Chevron.110 But the 
EEOC’s argument only works if the word “voluntary” is amenable to the 
construction that the agency has created. If it is not, the EEOC cannot adopt 
that interpretation, even if doing so would harmonize the ADA with the 
ACA. In administrative law terms, such an interpretation would flunk 
Chevron’s first step.111 The question thus boils down to whether the EEOC 
can reasonably say that a health assessment is still “voluntary” if there is a 
substantial financial penalty for refusing to take it. Notice that the ACA has 
no bearing on that inquiry. It is purely a question of the meaning of the ADA. 
That is where the EEOC’s argument falls apart. The average premium 
for a family plan in 2015 was $17,545; thirty percent of that is $5263.112 
Under the EEOC’s rule, then, an employer can dock an employee with family 
coverage’s pay more than five thousand dollars if she refuses to undergo a 
health assessment. No reasonable person would view a health assessment 
as “voluntary” when backed by a draconian penalty. Indeed, until this latest 
rule, the EEOC viewed any penalty as problematic; in enforcement 
guidelines, the agency explained that an assessment was voluntary only “as 
long as an employer neither requires participation nor penalizes employees 
who do not participate.”113 The agency is free, in rulemaking, to adjust its 
understanding of what qualifies as voluntary. But it is not free to close its 
eyes to the coercive effect of exorbitant financial penalties. 
The EEOC’s rule is thus legally vulnerable. Whether it will be 
successfully challenged remains to be seen, but Congress may ultimately 
need to resolve the tension between its avid support for wellness programs 
and its efforts to stamp out disability discrimination. 
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VI: CONCLUSION 
The evidence does not support the unbridled enthusiasm for wellness 
programs that has swept the country. Some wellness programs that focus 
on managing chronic illnesses may be effective, but the lifestyle-
management programs that are now ubiquitous in the American workplace 
almost certainly are not. Reflecting the degree to which skepticism is borne 
out by the empirical literature, wellness-industry executives are reportedly 
reimagining the value proposition of their programs to de-emphasize return 
on investment.114 
What is more, some of those programs appear to violate the ADA, at 
least where their financial inducements leave employees with little 
practical choice of whether to participate in a health assessment. Should 
firms hope to use wellness programs to minimize healthcare spending, they 
would do well to prioritize disease management over lifestyle management. 
Similarly, insofar as the federal government aims to structure regulations 
to support effective wellness programs, it should orient its policies to favor 
disease management. No good reason exists for federal policy to support 
the entrenchment and expansion of empirically unsubstantiated lifestyle-
management programs. In particular, the EEOC’s efforts to insulate 
wellness programs from the ADA should be reconsidered; the financial 
penalties that the ACA permits for an employee’s non-compliance with a 
wellness program are so large that they cannot reasonably be viewed as 
voluntary within the meaning of the ADA. Though the EEOC judges them to 
be non-coercive, this is a departure from its prior view of financial penalties. 
Even disease-management programs raise concerns. The durable 
connection between employment and health coverage may make it 
inevitable that employers will seek to become stewards of their employees’ 
health. But disease-management programs target employees with chronic 
conditions, many of whom are disabled under federal law. The ADA likely is 
not an impediment to such programs: it prohibits “classifying” disabled 
workers in a way “that adversely affects the[ir] opportunities or status,”115 
and it is hard to see how a wellness program that rewards the chronically ill 
for participating “adversely” affects them. But even if the law is no obstacle, 
many people find it unsettling that employers can interfere in their disabled 
employees’ private medical decisions. Firms assertively entering the 
disease-management space may give rise to the specter—whether or not it 
gives rise to the corresponding reality—that employers could predicate 
other decisions upon employee health. The rise of such concerns may 
provide even more reason to question the wisdom of linking coverage to 
employment. 
The evidence favoring disease-management programs is not 
conclusive. In the Medicare population, in particular, such programs do not 
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appear to have met with consistent success.116 The Congressional Budget 
Office evaluated major demonstration projects in care coordination and 
disease management in Medicare, and none has achieved spending or 
quality targets.117 One possible explanation for this discrepancy is that 
findings from the elderly Medicare population do not generalize well to 
working-age Americans who have access to insurance through their 
employers; perhaps chronic conditions, targeted at earlier stages, are more 
responsive to intervention and management. Alternatively, disease-
management strategies offered by employers may be different and more 
effective than interventions in the Medicare demonstrations. Or it is 
possible that the studies finding strong return on investment for employers’ 
disease-management efforts were anomalies. These areas are ripe for 
future research. 
Ultimately, however, the evidence on wellness programs is 
discomfiting. Most programs do not work; some raise serious legal 
concerns. It is time for employers and policymakers to rethink their 
enthusiasm for the wellness movement. 
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